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Japanese Americans and Central
European Jews: A Comparison of PostWar Reparation Problems
By MARY REIKO OSAKA*
Member of the Class of 1982.

The problems involved in making reparations payments have
faced civilized nations throughout history. While reparations have
usually been exacted from defeated nations by the victors, at least two
situations in recent history have presented special considerationsthose of the Central European Jews and of the Japanese American citizens and resident aliens displaced during World War II.
The atrocities committed by the Third Reich against the Jews'have
been Well-documented.' The successor state to the Third Reich, led by
Konrad Adenauer, committed itself to a policy of reparations to the
Jews, motivated by a sense of moral obligation and the desire to estabFederal Republic of Germany as a legitimate, friendly world
lish the
2
entity.
The same war which evoked the Nazi atrocities generated another
racially-based deprivation of liberty. -Claiming military necessity, the
military commander of the Western Defense Command of the United
States recommended that all Japanese Americans and resident aliens of
Japanese descent be removed from militarily sensitive areas.3 As a restilt, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066. 4 Under the
order, thousands of people were forcibly moved from their homes on
the Pacific Coast to "relocation centers" throughout the western United
States.
Property, businesses, and educational opportunities were lost as a
result of the Evacuation.5 The order was upheld by the United States
*

The author wishes to particularly acknowledge Lyle C. Wing, Dr. Franklin Ng,

Professor Ted C. Hinckley, Professor Williamson B.C. Chang, and Edward Kitazumi.
1. See, eg., THE NAZI YEARS (J. Remak ed. 1969).

2. See text accompanying notes 38-53 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 16-22 infra.
4. 3 C.F.R. Cum. Supp. 1092 (1942).

5. In a letter to the National Coalition for Redress and Reparations dated September
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Supreme Court as within constitutionally granted emergency war powers of the President, an official viewpoint which has never been retracted.6 Thus, Japanese American citizens and resident aliens
(hereinafter Japanese Americans)7 have not had an adequate remedy
for their losses.
Spurred on by various citizens' groups, Congress established a
commission in July, 1980 in order to "gather facts to determine whether
any wrong was committed against those American citizens and permanent resident aliens affected by Executive Order No. 9066. "8 The institution of this commission may lead to a governmental admission that a
wrong was committed and may additionally provide the basis for making amends to the Japanese Americans affected by the experience.
In support of the concept of reparations for Japanese American
internees, the response of the Federal Republic of Germany to the
12, 1980, Raymond Okamura, a respected Japanese American scholar, expressed his distress
over the continued use of the term "Evacuation" in describing the Japanese American wartime experience. Mr. Okamura characterized the term as merely a "government euphemism" to imply that the Japanese American population was moved for its own safety, as in
the case of flood or other natural disaster. Another term which has been suggested is "sequestration." For expediency and with due respect and apologies to Mr. Okamura and
others, the term "Evacuation" will be used in this Note to encompass the evacuation, exclusion, and internment experience, unless otherwise distinguished.
6. Although Executive Order 9066 was retracted by President Ford in 1976 (Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (1976)), the Supreme Court cases upholding the constitutionality of the order are still valid. See United States v. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
and United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), discussed at text accompanying notes
23-37 infra.
7. The author chooses not to distinguish between those Japanese Americans who were
citizens by birthright and those, usually the parents of such citizens, who were not citizens
because the law did not permit their naturalization. See generally A. BoswoRTH,
AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 35-37 (1967). This categorization results from a firm
belief that a substantial number of the Japanese resident aliens in the United States would
have become citizens if they had been allowed to.
8. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, Pub. L. No.
96-317, 94 Stat. 964 (1980). The law reads:
Sec. 4(a): It shall be the duty of the Commission to1) review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order numbered
9066...
2) review directives of the United States military forces requiring the relocation and, in some cases, detention in internment camps of American citizens ...
3) recommend appropriate remedies.
(b) The Commission shall hold public hearings in such cities of the United States
that it finds appropriate.
(c) The Commission shall submit a written report of its findings and recommendations to Congress not later than.., one year after the date of the first meeting
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crimes against the Jews can be used as a precedent for the United
States. Based on moral obligation and a sense of fair play, the policy of
Wiedergutmachung,9 or a making of amends, sets a significant example
for the United States. This policy could be termed governing national
policy through conscience.
The United States' treatment of the Japanese Americans was
grounded on the same deprivation of liberty and property as was the
injustice to the Jews. This Note will focus on the need for the United
States to clearly identify that treatment as wrong.' 0
The nature of the wrong inflicted on the Jews and the Japanese
Americans will be explored, as well as the political climate existing at
the time the wrongs were inflicted and at the time the reparations to the
Jews were made. The Note will conclude with a discussion of remedies
offered by the Federal Republic of Germany, and strengths and weaknesses of remedies available for the Japanese Americans.
1.
A.

THE NATURE OF THE WRONG

Federal Republic of Germany

The injury to the European Jews was a result of Nazi Germany's
national policy of racial discrimination and genocide." Legislation
aimed at depriving Jews of their freedom and personal possessions was
an integral part of Nazi society; Jews were singled out for persecution
and discrimination in an overt and clearly intentional way through the
use of express governmental and societal institutions. 2
As a result of the Anschluss and other Nazi takeovers in Europe,
the policy of persecution spread from Germany over most of the continent. 13 The issue of possible later restitution thus became international
in nature, going beyond the scope of governmental indemnification
9. Ferencz, Conscience as an Instrument of NationalPolicy, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS 42, 45
(1979).
10. It is beyond the scope of this Note to detail the legislative mechanics of the exclusion, or to discuss fully the constitutional violations involved. For a comprehensive analysis
of the constitutional issues involved, see Rostow, The JapaneseAmerican Cases-A Disaster,
54 YALE LJ. 489 (1945); California State Bar Subcommittee on Redress/Reparations; briefs
of the Bay Area Attorneys for Redress to the Congressional Commission, 1981.
11. See A. BULLOCK, HITLER: A STUDY IN TYRANNY 406-08 (1964); N. BALABKINS,
WEST GERMAN REPARATIONS TO ISRAEL 3-15 (1971).
12. For a detailed look into German life under Hitler, see THE NAZI YEARS, supra note
1; D. SCHOENBAuM, HITLER'S SocIAL REVOLUTION (1966).
13. Jews from Russia, Poland, France, and other occupied areas of Europe suffered or
fled, as did millions of others whom, for whatever reasons, the Nazi regime would not tolerate. See N. RICH, HrrLu's WAR AIMS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW ORDER 1-8 (1974).
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solely to citizens of the offending government's country. The international nature of the persecution helped open the way for later restitution-claims could be pursued against the German government by
other national governments and international organizations in accordance with international law.
In addition to claims based on loss of property and liberty, the
Jewish people had a unique claim against the German state. The policy of exterminating an entire community of people was grievous
enough to support special claims, such as payments to Israel, a nation
14
of Jews which was not even in existence at the time of the wrong.
Another unique aspect of the claim against the German government is
that the claims were made against a successor government which had
not directly perpetrated the wrongs complained of.15 In the United
States, the claims by Japanese Americans are being made against the
same government that was in power at the time the claims arose.
B. United States
The policy of evacuation of Japanese Americans pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066 was executed within the framework of a constitutional system of government that was ostensibly seeking to protect its
internal security in time of war. Officially, the incarceration was based
on the presumption that Japanese Americans were more likely than
other people to aid and abet the enemy.16 The program was primarily
limited to Japanese Americans living in the West Coast states; however,
the basis for designating the entire Japanese American population on
the Pacific Coast as a menace to the rest of the country has never been
fully or fairly explained.17
14. Included in the eventual German-Israeli agreement was a payment of DM 3 billion
for Israel's integration and absorption of Jewish refugee/immigrants. See N. BALABKINS,
supra note 11, at 143.
15. See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra. The payments by the Bonn government
served, in part, as a repudiation of the Third Reich's actions. See text accompanying notes
51-53 infra.
16. See text accompanying note 18 infra.
17. While Hawaii and Alaska also had some temporary detention centers, no large scale
evacuation was carried out in either of these areas, despite the coastal nature of their locations. This would seem to weaken the justification for designating the West Coast population as more suspect than others simply because of its easy access to the Pacific. See A.
BOSWORTH, supra note 7, at 121-25; J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, PPEUDIcE,
WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 134-35 (1954) [hereinafter cited as J. TENBROEK]. Indeed, in
a secret report, a State Department representative, Curtis Munson, expressed his opinion
that racial animosity was the basis for the segregation of the Japanese Americans on the
mainland. The Japanese Americans in Hawaii were allegedly more easily accepted by their
non-Japanese peers, and thus less likely than their mainland counterparts to appear treach-
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In 1942, Lt. General DeWitt, military commander of the Western
Defense Command (San Francisco), submitted a report to the President expressing his opinion that those persons of Japanese ancestry
who resided on the West Coast were in a likely position to aid the Japanese war effort against the United States."8 Although no evidence has
ever been presented to substantiate DeWitt's opinion of Japanese
American treachery, 19 under his recommendation all Japanese Ameri-

cans, except insane persons or persons on their deathbeds, were suspected of possible treason.2" In all, over 100,000 Japanese Americans
were forcibly evacuated from their homes and sent to relocation centers
in various "safe" locations.21 Some individuals remained in these "detention centers" for up to three years.22
The United States Supreme Court upheld the right of the government to decide what constituted "military necessity" without further

significant judicial investigation as to the reasonableness of that decision in Hirabayashiv. United States (1943)23 and Korematsu v. United

States (1944).24 In Hirabayashi, Chief Justice Stone wrote: "In this
case it is enough that circumstances within the knowledge of those
charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense af-

forded a rational basis for the decision they made. ' 25 The court thus
upheld the order without subjecting it to the strict scrutiny traditionally
required where allegedly discriminatory action is based on racial
classification.26
erous. He also pointed out the logistical problem of attempting to move the great number of
Japanese Americans in Hawaii. See M. WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY 33, 47-49 (1976).
18. U.S. ARMY, FinAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM WEST COAST 1942
(1943).
19. See generally A. BOswORTH, supra note 7; M. WEGLYN, supra note 17; W.
HOSOKAWA, NISEI: ThE QuiET AMERICANS (1969).
20. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 17, at 125-26 for a more detailed description of excluded individuals.
21. The camps were located at Poston and Gila River, Arizona; Manzanar and Tule
Lake, California; Minidoka, Idaho; Heart Mountain, Wyoming; Granada, Colorado; Topaz,
Utah; and Rohwer and Jerome, Arkansas. The camps had a total capacity of 119,000. M.
WEGLYN, supra note 17, at 86.
22. The indefinite incarceration of those Japanese Americans found to be loyal was
struck down as unconstitutional in Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). See text accompanying notes 33-36 infra. Some individuals were still at the Tule Lake facilities at the beginning of 1946. See A. BoswoRTH, supra note 7, at 232-33.
23. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
24. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
25. 320 U.S. at 102.
26. In addition, the Court did not explain why alien German and Italian persons, whose'
home countries were also at war with the United States, were not just as likely to be treacherous as the Japanese Americans. This discrepancy is particularly notable in light of the fact
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It is notable that in Korematsu, Justice Black took great pains to
emphasize that basic principles of American justice forbid exclusionary
orders based on race. He stated that:
Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case. . . of a
loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial
prejudice ....
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice
without reference to the real military dangers. . . presented, merely
confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military
Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military, authorities feared an invasion. .... 2
What the decision seems to say is that whenever the "properly constituted military authorities" fear an invasion, they are free to do what
they wish, even infringe on the personal liberty rights of an entire subclass of the population. All that would be required is some "rational
basis" for the action. There was no mention of a need to declare martial law.
The actions of the United States government did not go unquestioned at the time.28 In an excellent analysis of the possible constitutional violations involved, Eugene Rostow, then a professor at Yale
Law School, wrote:
Our war-time treatment of Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese descent on the West Coast has been hasty, unnecessary and mistaken. The course of action which we undertook was in no way
required or justified by the circumstances of the war. It was calculated to produce both individual injustice and deep-seated social
maladjustments of a cumulative and sinister kind.2 9
Rostow went on to criticize the proposition that military action be
treated like that of other administrative agencies, to be upheld if supthat German and Italian aliens chose to remain citizens of their home countries, while because of restrictive naturalization laws, the Japanese aliens were denied the opportunity to
become citizens. Under the decision in Bessho v. United States, 178 F. 245 (4th Cir. 1910),
aliens of the Japanese race were specifically deemed ineligible for naturalization. In the
Bessho case, the court held that under the Immigration Act of 1906, the privilege of naturalization was limited to free white persons and persons of African descent, thus excluding
Japanese. 178 F. at 246-47. Public Proclamation 5 specifically granted more favorable treatment to German and Italian aliens. See A. GIRDNER & A. LoFris, THE GREAT BETRAYAL
522-23 (1969).
27. 323 U.S. at 223.
28. Many internees protested, and were then physically isolated from their peers by war
authorities. For a study of this segregation o internees, see D. THOMAS & R. NIsmMoTo,
THE SPOILAGE (1946).
29. Rostow, supra note 10, at 489.
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ported by some "rational basis." He felt that some stricter standard of
review was necessary. In Korematsu, for example, he found fault with
between the
the lack of a judicial attempt to show a reasonable 3relation
0
situation and the remedy adopted to deal with it.
Indeed, by the time Korematsu was decided, three justices from the
unanimous Hirabayashicourt had changed their positions. 3 1 Most significantly, Justice Jackson recognized a serious problem in the Court's
validation of a military order: while a military order lasts only for the
duration of the emergency, a court validation of such an order validates
the principle of racial discrimination embodied in that order. The principle then "lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of urgent need." 32
It is significant that in the later case of Exparte Endo33 Executive
Order No. 9066 was held to confer only the right of evacuation and
exclusion on the military, not the right to detain the Japanese Americans in the camps. As Justice Douglas wrote:
We must assume that the Chief Executive and members of Congress,
as well as the courts, are sensitive to and respectful of the liberties of
the citizen. In interpreting a wartime measure we must assume that
their purpose was to allow for the greatest possible accomodation between those liberties and the exigencies of war. We must assume,
when asked to find implied powers ...that the law makers intended
to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they used....
Although in Endo the Court did not invalidate the Hrabayashi
and Korematsu holdings that the President and other authorities could
order the evacuation and continued exclusion from militarily sensitive
areas, it did hold that to detain loyal citizens in the relocation centers
30. Id. at 506.
31. In his dissent, Justice Roberts said: "[lit is the case of convicting a citizen as a
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty ..." 323 U.S. at 226.
Justice Murphy penned the strongest and most memorable words in his dissent:
This exclusion of 'all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien'
from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of martial
law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.
Id. at 233.
32. 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
33. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). See also note 22 supra.
34. 323 U.S. at 300.
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was not consistent with the stated purpose of the Evacuation.35 Thus,
there was some recognition that an interference of serious dimensions
was indeed involved, perhaps dangerously close to the parameters of
constitutional protection. This case indicates not only a "softening" of
the Court's previous hard-line approach, but is also significant because
it may lay the groundwork for damages arising from the internment of
Japanese Americans, as discussed below.36
To date, the Hirabayashiand Korematsu decisions have not been
overruled, and there has been no official retraction regarding the validity of the military decision. Thus, until there is a determination by the
special commission" that a wrong was committed by the government
in sequestering Japanese Americans, the Japanese Americans affected
by the sequestration will have no adequate remedy for their
internment.
II. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
A. Federal Republic of Germany
1. Leadership
The attitudes within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the
successor state to the Third Reich, contributed immeasurably to the
eventual success of the Jewish-German agreement. Many commentators have attributed the institution of a reparations policy
(Wiedergutmachung)35 to the singleminded zeal of the Federal Republic's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Dr. Nahum Goldmann, then
chairman of the Conference of Jewish Claims Against Germany,
stated:
The example, which Dr. Adenauer has given his people, in his
attitude to the problems of Israel and the question of reparations...
must serve ...

Germany as a guideline ....

[H]e has also made

every effort to fill his people with a new spirit of democracy and deep
respect for moral and spiritual values, which alone constitute an effective guarantee against a revival of the horrors of the past.3 9
In his autobiography, Adenauer outlined his goals for the Christian Democratic Party. He believed in a strong Christian party, to help
35. The stated purpose of the Evacuation was "the protection of the war effort against
espionage and sabotage." Id.
36. See text accompanying note 91 infra.
37. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
38. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
39. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL 186 (R. Vogel ed. 1969).
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counter the "increasingly materialistic approach to political matters."40
He also hoped for a political life in the FRG which was not based on
interests of separate strata and classes, one which would seek to include
all denominations, including, of course, the Jews. He strongly believed
in the Western Christian principle of the dignity and liberty of the individual over the concerns of the state; this he saw as the bulwark of
defense against an atheist dictatorship of either left or right .4a In a letter to Dr. Goldmann on December 6, 1951, Adenauer applied these
goals to the problem of compensating the Jews: "I would remark that
the Federal Government regards the problem of reparations above all
as a moral obligation, and considers it a duty of honour for the Gertheir utmost to make good the wrong done to the
man people to do
42
people."
Jewish
Adenauer led the way towards a settlement of the reparations
claims. As early as 19494" he publicly pledged support for a new German-Jewish policy, and in 1951 he promised the chief Jewish negotiator, Dr. Noah Barou, that he would acknowledge before the Parliament
the nation's responsibility for Nazi acts, and make a public declaration
of the Federal Republic's intent to compensate European Jewry for
material losses suffered. 44
During the delicate negotiations, and often going against the advice of his economic advisors, Adenauer steadfastly continued to meet
with Jewish leaders in efforts to reach an agreement. 45 Adenauer even
raised the issue at the London Debt Conference of February, 1952,
where the main purpose was to settle pre- and post-war debts owed to
creditors. However, Hermann Abs, head of the German Credit Institution for Reconstruction and chief negotiator for the German delegation
in London, warned Adenauer that the debt settlements would have to
come before any monetary commitments to the Jews could be
formed.' Meanwhile, the Jewish leaders wanted to have their claims
separated from those in London,4 7 and the Allied powers had already
indicated that they would not support a claim for reparations from a
40. K.

ADENAUER, MEMOIRS

43 (1966).

41. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 44-45.

42. Id. at 36.
43. N. BALABKINS, supra note 11, at 85. Adenauer offered Israel DM 10 million worth
of German-made goods as a "symbolic gesture of material amends." Id.
44. Id. at 90-95.
45. R. HSCOCKS, THE ADENAUER ERA 33 (1966).
46. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 42-43.
47. N. BALABKINS, smupra note 11, at 45.
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country (Israel) which did not exist at the time of the wrong.4"
An additional factor which widened the international scope of the
reparations problem was the relationship of the parties seeking and
granting reparations. The claims by the world Jews were filed primarily through Israel, a new nation which the Jews wanted to make into
their national homeland. Israel sought to collect general reparations
claims, individual relief, the individual claims of those who died without heirs, and the costs of integrating hundreds of thousands of refugees into the nation after the destruction of traditional Jewish areas in
much of Europe.4 9 Although other groups participated in the negotiations, most notably the Conference on Jewish Claims against Germany,
all payments were ultimately made to Israel. Individual claims were, in
turn, processed by Israel.5 0 Thus, the eventual settlement was effected
between two nations, rather than as a compensation scheme between a
government and its former citizens.
2.

Public and World Opinion

The German public, meanwhile, was not strongly united behind
Adenauer's efforts. While not openly adverse to the negotiations, it
seems that the public was apathetic. For example, when the eventual
reparations agreement with Israel became law, a popular contributions
drive was instituted that netted only about DM 100,000. 11
World opinion may have influenced the German legislators in
their eventual support of a reparations agreement. Reestablishment of
relations between world Jewry and the FRG would tend to show that a
new Germany, one which even the Jews could deal with openly, was
now a trusted, legitimate world entity. Although the Allied powers did
not publicly support the Jewish claims, there is some indication that
such a policy was favored.5 2 If the FRG could gain some status as a
respectable world entity, one which her neighbors and conquerors
could view as a friend and economic trading partner, her post-war recovery would be that much faster, and prosperity and peace could return to the people.5 3
48. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 39-40.
49. N. BALABKINS, stpra note 11, at 83.
50. Id. at 143.
51. Id. at 139.
52. Id. at 130-31. In the impasse between Dr. Abs of the German delegation of
financial experts and Dr. Shinnar of Israel, President Truman intervened on behalf of the
Jews and helped set up a conference between the two parties. Id.
53. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 39. See also R. HIscocKs, sutpra
note 45, at 29.
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While the reparations policy might have stemmed from a true desire to atone for a wrong, such a "noble stand" could also only help the
new government gain status in the eyes of the world. Thus, the need to
rebuild the nation was sufficiently strong to take the reparations issue
out of a strictly "moral obligation" and elevate it to a matter of great
economic and political significance.
B. The United States
1. Leadership
The Japanese Americans have no counterpart to Konrad
Adenauer in the United States government. Although some politicians
might agree that the Evacuation was a mistake, 4 there is no apparent
strong moral commitment among national leaders to remedy the past
wrong. Significantly, the Japanese American cause lacks a particularly
powerful leader to spearhead the movement for a reparations policy.
Without such leadership, there is no official opinion on the subject, nor
is there an official direction to follow with respect to a reparations plan.
2. Public Opinion
Although many citizens might also agree that the Evacuation was
a mistake, 55 there is no apparent popular national movement towards
remedying the past wrong. It may well be that many people still justify
the Evacuation as a "military necessity" or by thinking that its purpose
was to "protect" the Japanese Americans. In addition, American taxpayers may be hostile to the idea of distributing money as reparations,
particularly to a class which is traditionally economically stable. Indeed, many Japanese Americans are unsure whether monetary reparation is warranted. 6
54. See, e.g., E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 147-49 (1977). See also
opinon of Arthur Goldberg, Nichi Bei Times, Aug. 7, 1981. But see opinion of Senator S.I.
Hayakawa, L.A. Daily Journal, Aug. 11, 1981; Nisel Internees: Sympathy, But No Cash
Likely, S.F. Examiner, July 17, 1981, § A, at 3.
55. See The Outrider:America Owes a Debt to JapaneseInternedDuring WWII, Sacramento Bee, Aug. 11, 1981; Apologizing to Internees, New York Times, Aug. 4, 1981; First
Major City Endorsement,Nichi Bei Times, June 26, 1981; Tears,Jeers andFacts Underscore
CWRK-L4. Hearings,Pacific Citizen, Aug. 14, 1981;.4 HardLook, S.F. Sunday Examiner
and Chronicle, Aug. 2, 1981, § A, at 1. But see JapaneseTestifes 36 Years Later (opinion of
Jon Kawamoto), S.F. Examiner, Aug. 12, 1981, § B, at 5; Three Day Public Hearings on
Redress Comes to End Thursday, Nichi Bei Times, Aug. 15, 1981.
56. Compare Reparations? Nol, Pacific Citizen, Nov. 18, 1977, with March PollShows
909o FavorMonetary Redress, Pacific Citizen, June 5, 1981, and Nearly Solid Call For Internee Redress, S.F. Examiner, Aug. 13, 1981, § D, at 4.
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World Opinion and the National Scope

Since the problem in the United States is entirely within the
framework of the Constitution and national policy, with little or no
international ramifications, the government does not stand to gain an
elevation in world status of the same magnitude as did the FRG. The
United States government is not that of a vanquished state, seeking to
gain world favor in order to establish the validity of a successor
government.
While a move to compensate the Japanese Americans for losses
suffered as a result of the Evacuation would be morally laudable, it
does not seem likely that many nations would be inclined to react more
favorably to the United States if compensation were made. Indeed, the
United States might be open to even more criticism, as a result of having waited so long to render justice to its citizens. Such a later acknowledgement might serve as a perfect opportunity to argue that a
democracy does not work as reputed. 7
This issue presents another interesting comparison between the
FRG and the United States. While the Bonn government's moral obligation to redress the Jews was concurrent with a repudiation of the
government which perpetrated the wrong, the moral obligation of the
United States to redress the Japanese Americans would be an affirmation of the constitutional rule of law which should have initially protected the Japanese Americans.
Because of the national scope of the problem in the United States,
any remedy will have to come from either the courts or the legislature.
58 line of cases, a deciAbsent any case law to challenge the Hirabayashi
sion based on nontraditional grounds will have to govern the Japanese
American case. The absence of precedent did not preclude the FRG
from pursuing a comprehensive reparations policy based on moral obligation. It should likewise pose no obstacle to the United States.
III.
A.

REMEDIES

The Federal Republic of Germany
1. Legislation

The German-Jewish settlement came about after extensive negotiations between the FRG and Israel. The agreement, formulated at
57. The legislature expressed this fear in the legislative history of the 1948 Japanese
American Evacuation Claims Act. See text accompanying notes 98-99 infra.
58. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
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Wasenaar, the Netherlands, on September 10, 1952,59 had all the traditional characteristics of a treaty between two nations; although at that
time Israel was not an officially recognized country, it was treated as
60
such.
As a treaty, the agreement had to be presented to both houses of
the German legislature before being signed into law.6 ' In Israel, the
Parliament likewise had to approve the agreement. Thus, even though
the policy was carried out as a function of national law, it originated as
an international treaty agreement.
In the FRG, Adenauer lent the support of his leadership position
and of his Christian Democratic Party to the ratification debates. As
the German legislature was about to convene to discuss the matter,
Adenauer urged ratification in his opening speech, reinforcing the
moral reasons for reparation by stating that "[s]uch action is a necessity, if only for moral reasons. '62
Every major political party in the legislature eventually followed
the executive lead, and the ratification was signed into law on March
20, 1953.63 Certainly, all involved realized the significance of a reestablishment of German-Jewish relations.' Most of the sparse dissent was
based on the grounds that the FRG could not afford to meet the terms,
which called for a total of DM 3.45 billion to be paid in currency, gold,
silver, and products within the following twelve to fourteen years.65
Some dissent was also based on other grounds. For example, a
neo-Nazi group claimed American capitalism was responsible for the
entire scheme.66 The Arab nations also registered strong disapproval,
claiming that Israel was a potential aggressor state, having already
seized and kept Arab property when settling in Palestine. The Arabs
were mollified somewhat by the Federal Republic's promise to supply
59. Agreement Between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, Sept. 10, 1952,
162 U.N.T.S. 205. See generally N. BALABKINS, supra note 11, at 119-36.
60. For example, the treaty was subject to adjudication in German courts in case of
disuptes; the Israeli mission at Cologne had status and privileges generally accorded to diplomatic and not just trade missions, including immunity from prosecution and freedom from
taxes. N. BALABKINS, supra note 11, at 146, 151.
61. See A. HEIDENHEIMER, THE GOVERNMENTS OF GERMANY 115-20 (1961).
62. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 69 (text of speeches before the
legislature, March 4, 1953).
63. N. BALABKINS, supra note 11, at 150.
64. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 69-87; N. BALABKINS, supra note

11, at 205-14. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
65. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 56-67.
66. N. BALABKUNs, supra note 11, at 141-42, 149-50.
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aid to the Arab states as well.6 7

As for the criticism that Israel could not rightly receive reparations
because there had been no war between the FRG and Israel, Chancellor Adenauer characterized the payments not as reparations but as
compensation for Israel's costs in settling the refugee Jews who were
displaced by Nazi actions.68 He also said that the basis for this agreement vested not on strictly legal grounds, but rather on a moral obligation that was so strong as to be elevated to a legal obligation.6 9
2. In Israel
In Israel, there was more of an ideological split; the leaders realized the importance to the FRG of establishing good relations with
world Jewry, and many people felt that to deal with Germany again
meant according Germans human status, whereas in reality, to many
Jews, Germans were all still inhumane Nazis.70
There was also the concern that the promises of the government
and of Adenauer were really "paper promises," unenforceable in reality, and useful only to the Germans as a sort of absolution for their
crimes. The wrongs suffered at the hands of the Nazis were considered
incompensable: as one writer said, "How much money for one dead
Jew?" 71 Indeed, the idea of dealing with the Germans was so repug-

Parliament
nant to some people that a riot took place while the Israeli
72
was debating whether to enter negotiations for a treaty.
The treaty was ratified, however, and on the whole, the Israeli
leaders were pleased.73 Although the terms were not as originally demanded, they represented at least a good faith effort by a government
with only limited capacity to make reparation payments.74 Property
losses were calculated, but the adequacy of this remedy for the Jews
was not really at issue; there could, of course, be no real compensation
for the murder of six million Jews, except in principle.
3. Mutual Benefit
The agreement was in some ways a convenient vehicle for two
67. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 72-73.
68. Id. at 70.
69. Id. at 71.
70. N. BALABKINS, supra note 11, at 93.
71. Id. at 138. DM 3 billion for 6 million Jews killed was calculated to be only DM 500
for each murdered victim.
72. Id. at 120-22.
73. Id. at 139.
74. Id. at 190-205.
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governments seeking friendship, as well as political and economic aims.
The FRG gained a better world image to help in its rebuilding efforts.
In addition, the agreement created the sense that insofar as was possible, the German people had attempted to repudiate Hitler and all he
represented.
The Jews got much needed aid for their new homeland. In, addition to the monetary compensation, there was a very significant moral
concession-the acceptance by the Bonn government of an obligation
75
to redress some of the injustices perpetrated by the Nazi government.
Finally, Israel gained credence as a new, legitimate nation by successfully negotiating a treaty settlement with another nation, in a situation
which demanded the utmost skill and diplomacy.
In accordance with the often complicated and sensitive balance of
international relations, these two countries were able to come to a compromise which, while not wholly satisfactory for either side, at least
accomplished some important ideological and economic ends, all
within the framework of international law.
B.

The United States

The damage suffered by the Japanese Americans was more restricted than was the harm to the Jews. That fact, in addition to the
solely national character of the wrong, means that a settlemeni for the
Japanese Americans would have no international ramifications. In the
absence of treaties to negotiate or an international community to repay,
the only remedy offered thus far has been the 1948 Japanese American
Claims Act.7 6 As discussed below, the Act was inadequate as a means
of redress.
1. Legislation
After the United States Supreme Court determined in Hirabayashi
that the abrogation of liberty interests involved in the Evacuation was
not unconstitutional,7 7 the only claims left to the Japanese Americans
were for losses resulting from deprivation of property without due process of law. In many cases, the evacuees were given as little as three
days to sell or store everything except household and personal items
which could be hand-carried.7" It was inevitable that "scalpers" would
75.
76.
77.
78.

THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 115-17.
Pub. L. No. 80-886, ch. 814, 62 Stat. 1231 (1948).
See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
A. BOSWORTH, supra note 7, at 113; M. WErLYN, supra note 17, at 77.
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take advantage of the situation to buy valuable businesses, land,
homes, and other possessions at outrageously unfair prices."9 Those
who managed to store their belongings in government-designated
warehouses quite often returned to find that'lax security measures and
an apathetically administered identification system resulted in widespread theft and loss.8"
President Truman, responding to the recognized need for some
sort of compensation, signed the Japanese American Evacuation
Claims Act in 1948 (1948 Claims Act).8" The Act authorized the Attorney General to adjudicate and settle the claims of Japanese Americans
for damage to or loss of real or personal property, provided that the
damage or loss was a reasonableandnaturalconsequence of the Evacuation and subsequent exclusion from military areas in Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, or Hawaii by Executive Order
9066.82 Among those claims not included in the Act were the

following:
a. Claims of persons who, after December 7, 1941, were voluntarily
or involuntarily deported from the United States to Japan;
b. Claims for damage or loss due to personal injury, personal inconvenience, physical hardship, or mental suffering;
83
c. Claims for loss of anticipated profits or earnings.
Wlile there were other excluded claims, the three mentioned here
had the most severe impact. On its face, the 1948 Claims Act was not
an acceptable or adequate compensation scheme. Many claims were
precluded which could in fact be said to be quite reasonable and entirely justified.
a. Deportation
In the United States, the usual basis for deporting people against
their will is a finding by the authorities that the person is an undesirable presence in the country.8 4 Many Japanese Americans were involuntarily deported on this basis, particularly those who had strong ties
to their Japanese heritage, such as community leaders, Japanese school
79. A. BoSwoRTH, supra note 7, at 243.
80. Id. at 244. For a more comprehensive analysis, see D. MEYER,
CANS, 245-56 (1971).
81. Pub. L. No. 80-886, ch. 814, 62 Stat. 1231 (1948).
82, Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
83. Id. §2.
84. See general 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
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officials, and any whose positions suggested loyalty to the Emperor. 85
To make the preclusion from bringing a claim under the 1948 Claims
Act to operate fairly, there should have been an additional determination that those who were proclaimed undesirable and subject to involuntary deportation were given a fair deportation hearing, not one
subject to the same war hysteria that clouded the Evacuation proceeding generally. The 1948 Claims Act did not provide for such a
determination.
Those who accepted voluntary deportation raise another issue;
namely, whether they should be automatically precluded from claiming

compensation. An example of voluntary deportation is the case of the
so-called "no-no boys," who refused to swear unqualified allegiance to
the country that had imprisoned them as security risks.86 Many were
frightened or bitter 7 and preferred the risk of travelling to war-torn

Japan to staying in a relocation center where no one was certain of
what the military was planning. While such voluntary deportation may
seem prima facie evidence of disloyalty, the evidence does not seem so
clear when considering the alternative. The Japanese Americans faced
85. J. TENBROEK, supra note 17, at 101. This group included all the fishermen working
at Terminal Island.
86. The "no-no"boys were those who answered "no" to both questions 27 and 28 on the
"loyalty questionaire" to be filled out by all male Japanese American citizens aged 17 or
older. This questionaire, issued by the U.S. War Reclamation Authority, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1943-1946), asked:
27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States, in combat
duty, wherever ordered?
28. Will you swear unqualifed allegience to the United States of America and
faithfully defend the United States from any and all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegience or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?
A. BoswoRTH, supra note 7, at 165. Questions for female citizens and all aliens were much
the same except for reference to military service. "No" answers to one or both of the questions were not necessarily indicative of disloyalty. As Bosworth points out, a "yes" answer
to number 28 would leave the aliens stateless. Id. at 165-68. Moreover, if the alien parents
answered "no" and the citizen children answered "yes," a family might be separated, which
was especially undesirable when the parents were aging or non-English speaking.
87. With respect to question number 27, many of the "no-no" boys were confused, resentful, and bitter about being required to defend a country that marched parents, sisters,
wives, and children off to barbed-wire enclosed camps. The problem was compounded by
the dual citizenship system of Japan, under which children of Japanese nationals were automatically given Japanese citizenship. In 1924, however, the parents were required to register
their children's births with the Japanese consulate or the children would hold only American
citizenship. Thus, by the time of the Evacuation, only fifteen to twenty-five percent of the
Japanese Americans held dual citizenship. Nevertheless, fears of treachery were heightened
by misconceptions regarding dual citizenship. J. TENBROEK, supra note 17, at 271-73, 31121.
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voluntary bankruptcy and a move, en masse, to desolate, primative surroundings, to live enclosed in barbed wire, all in order to "prove" loyalty to the United States."8
b. General Tort Claims
The denial of general tort claims-personal injury, personal inconvenience, physical hardship, and mental suffering-assumes that the
only damages suffered as a result of the Evacuation were those to property. Under this assumption, a great deal of actual damage is not compensable by the terms of the 1948 Claims Act. Significantly, this denial
further supports the "legality" of the Evacuation, by deeming compensable only those losses which amounted to a taking of property without
due process of law, while giving no recognition to the other damages
sustained. Hence, there is no recognition of the wrong committed in
evacuating and interning the Japanese Americans.
The physical, mental, and emotional damages suffered by the interned Japanese Americans were not only severe, but long-lasting. For
example, the Evacuation and internment disrupted an entire way of life
for Japanese Americans, whose extended families are traditionally the
focus of their lives. The decentralization of their families left many
members, particularly traditional parents, with a sense of disrupted
patterns that went to the very fabric of their lives.
The 1948 Claims Act provided no compensation for the mental
and emotional turmoil suffered by these people. Similarly, the Act provided no compensation for the lasting emotional distress of the young
people, born in America, who were locked up as potential saboteurs
while older brothers died fighting for America on foreign soil. Although this was perhaps the greatest irony of the sequestration, it was
never taken into consideration by the Act. Likewise, no compensation
was offered for the physical hardships endured.89 Consequently, the
largest claims against the government went uncompensated. Yet, if one
failed to file under the 1948 Claims Act, all future claims were barred. 90
88. Alternatives to moving. to a relocation center included voluntary relocation to areas
outside the militarily sensitive areas. For example, the chick-sexing industry was heavily
dominated by Japanese American workers, most of whom were allowed to move outside the
military zones on demand of the poultry industry. See A. BoswoRTH, supra note 7, at 112,
135-36.
89. See, e.g., Nakahara, Shadows of War, The Washington Post, July 14, 1981, § C, at
1, col. 1; Kawamoto, Internment Camp Survivors Talk ofPhysicalToll, S.F. Examiner, Aug.
5, 1981, § B, at 10, col. 1; Kawamoto, Even Those Who Weren't InternedSuffered, S.F. Examiner, Aug. 13, 1981, § D, at 5, col. 1.
90. Pub. L. No. 80-886, ch. 814, 62 Stat. 1231, § 4(d) (1948).
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By denying compensation for claims other than property loss, the
government was lessening its responsibility for actual damages inflicted, particularly by the internment. This is significant, considering
that the court in ExparteEndo determined that such internment actually exceeded the authority of the Executive Order, and was thus illegal.9 ' By agreeing only to compensate for damage or loss arising out of
the evacuation and exclusion orders, not internment, the government
limited its liability for damages arising out of the internment policies,
even though these had already been judged illegal.
c. Loss of Antic#?atedEarnings
The effect of denying claims for loss of anticipated profits or earnings was severe and not readily apparent. A great majority of Japanese
Americans, particularly in California, were farmers; their claims for
loss would ordinarily and reasonably have included the fair market
value of unharvested crops. 92 But, under the 1948 Claims Act, such
claims were expressly precluded. 93 The Act also failed to authorize
compensation for loss of land, or for the loss of profits to be made from
later selling greatly appreciated property.
Similarly, businessmen were not allowed to file claims for anticipated earnings or business opportunities lost as a result of the Evacuation. Such losses included rents and debts otherwise due, which the
evacuees could not collect while interned. Students who had to forego
college educations were also-denied a remedy under law, as were community workers (e.g., Japanese language school teachers) who became
unemployed when the Japanese communities were displaced. While
problems of proof might have been substantial, these potential claimants were denied even the chance to seek compensation.
2. Application
The compensation provided under the 1948 Claims Act was also
inadequate in practical application. In contrast to the payments made
by the FRG, which were at least a good faith effort to compensate the
Jews,94 the amounts paid out under the 1948 Claims Act were grossly
inadequate. In 1942, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco esti91. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
92. This would be particularly true of farmers who only leased their land and equipment; without valid claims to the unharvested crops, they lacked a valid claim to any sort of
compensation for their labor. See A. GiRDNaR & A. LoFris, supra note 26, at 127-30.
93. Pub. L. No. 80-886, ch. 814, 62 Stat. 1231, § 2(b)(5) (1948).
94. This is not to suggest that the FRG payments could ever compensate for the grave
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95
mated the total loss as a result of the Evacuation to be $400 million.
By the deadline date of 1951, claims totalling approximately $132 million had been submitted.9 6 Of this amount, the average return realized
was only ten cents to the dollar. 97 This low rate of return effectively
turned the Act into nothing more than a token effort at compensation,
that barred future suits as well.

3.

Significance

As in the case of the German Jews, no monetary compensation can
adequately redress claims such as mental and emotional suffering, loss
of communities, and the deprivation of personal liberty. Since these
types of claims cannot truly be compensated monetarily, it may seem
that the inadequacies of the 1948 Claims Act were unavoidable. However, even casting aside the other inadequacies of the Act, the important fact remains that the 1948 Claims Act never undertook to admit
governmental wrongdoing in interning United States citizens and resident aliens without due process of law.
The legislative history of the 1948 Claims Act contains a letter
from the Secretary of the Interior to the Speaker of the House regarding the appropriateness of the Act. While the letter advocated compensation for the material losses suffered, there was no mention of98 the
possible invalidity of the Evacuation in the due process analysis.
Another consideration, however, was mentioned: "Not to redress
these loyal Americans in some measure for the wrongs inflicted upon
them would provide ample material for attacks by the followers of foreign ideologies on the American way of life and to redress them would
be simple justice." 99 Thus, one paragraph neatly encapsulated two
considerations which were far more prominent in the case of the FRG
than in that of the United States: world opinion and moral obligation.
It was the first official suggestion that perhaps the Japanese Americans
had suffered an injustice, even though concern for the Japanese Americans was subordinated to a concern for the anti-American propaganda
value that a denial of redress might have.
Significantly, however, the wrongs alluded to were only those ininjustices done to the Jews; the FRG payments, however, were a good faith effort by a
country with limited capacity to pay for some of the wrongs inflicted.
95. A. BoswoRTrH, supra note 7, at 236.
96. Id.; A. GIRDNER & A. LoFrIs, supra note 26, at 433.
97. A. GIRDNER & A. LoFris, supra note 26, at 436.
98. [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2297.
99. Id. at 2301.
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flicted as a result of Japanese American compliance with the Evacuation orders, and not the invalidity of the Evacuation itself. Had the
Japanese Americans never left the area, there would have been no material losses; the 1948 Claims Act dealt with the consequences of the
orders and did not acknowledge that the orders themselves were inherently wrong. Thus, the Act was clearly an inadequate expression of
reparatory intent.
4. Possible Future Legislative Remedies
Direct claims arising out of the Evacuation are barred in the courts
by the stare decisis effects of the Korematsu and Hirabayashidecisions.
Claims arising only out of the internment, which would not be barred
by Krematsu andHrabayashi,but would be governed by Endo,c0 are
also barred now due to the statute of limitations.
Further impediments to bringing claims might be found in
problems of proof after so many years, and by the fact that some elements of damage are difficult to calculate. Additionally, the 1948
Claims Act may act as an estoppel to future property loss claims.101
Whether other remedies will be available depends upon the flexibility
congressional commission esand imagination of the recently formed
10 2
situation.
this
investigate
to
tablished
If the commission determines that a wrong was committed,10 3 this
would open the way for further legislative action creating a remedy for
the Japanese Americans. As Chief Justice Burger has suggested, Congress is the proper body to create a remedy for fourth amendment violations, since Congress "has the facilities and competence for that
task-as we do not."'"
100. The Endo decision determined that the internment was not an authorized part of the
Evacuation. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
101. Section 4(d) of the Act says the awards under the Act will be "final and conclusive
for all purposes, notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, and shall be a
full discharge of the United States and all of its officers... with respect to all claims arising
out of the same subject matter." Pub. L. No. 80-886, ch. 814, 62 Stat. 1231, § 4(d) (1948).
Whether this would apply to those who did not file claims originally is not certain. However, it seems that an order of dismissal may be set aside and compensation allowed upon a
new review of the facts.
102. See note 8 and accompanying text, supra.
103. Chairperson Joan Bernstein has indicated that some wrong was committed. See
U.S. PanelSeeking "Why" of JapaneseInternment, Nichi Bei Times, July 15, 1981. Former
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, also a commission member, has vigorously denounced the Supreme Court cases upholding the Evacuation. See, e.g., Commission Member
on Korematsu Ruling, Nichi Bei Times, May 13, 1981.
104. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971).
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In UnitedStates v. Sioux Nation of Indians,l "5 the Supreme Court
gave Congress judicial clearance to redress a moral debt "not only by
direct appropriation, but also by waiving an otherwise valid defense to
a legal claim against the United States."'' °" That case presents a
method by which Congress could provide redress for the Japanese
by waiving the curAmericans through a lump sum appropriation, or
10 7
court.
in
claims
the
of
litigation
to
barriers
rent
Government culpability might actually be lessened if redress is
available to Japanese Americans solely through the court system. The
cumbersome process of finding liability, then deciding how much to
award to whom and on what basis, would probably take years to complete; many elderly victims now living would not survive to be directly
compensated. In addition, under general tort principles, those who
have died since the Evacuation would not leave surviving tort claims,
absent special dispensation.10°
Finally, the expense, inconvenience, and an ideological resistance
to suing the government would probably prevent a great many Japanese Americans from filing suit. This illustrates a split among Japanese
Americans. While most Japanese Americans today would agree that
the Evacuation was a grave injustice, there is a minority that feels that
monetary compensation is not necessary, or even desirable, expressing
sentiments much like those expressed by post-war Jews, that to accept
reparation payments would imply the wrong committed is compensable; le., that monetary reparations would be demeaning." ° Consistent
with this latter view, some Japanese Americans would be satisfied with
an official apology and an invalidation of the Hirabayashiand Korematsu cases. President Ford rescinded Executive11 Order No. 9066,110
and some feel that this is an acceptable apology '
However, considering the delay in investigating the situation, the
injustice of barring relief for tort claims, and the ineffective means of
compensating for millions of dollars of property loss, the official position of the National Coalition for Redress and Reparations and of the
Japanese American Citizens' League is that a mere apology will not be
105. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
106. Id. at 397.
107. Id. at 390-407.
108. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 900(a) (1977).
109. See note 56 supra.
110. See note 6 supra.
111. Reparations?Nol, Pacific Citizen, Nov. 18, 1977; Dollarsand Sense, Pacific Citizen,
April 20, 1979. See note 56 supra.

No. 1]

Post-War Reparation Problems

sufficient. 112
IV.

CONCLUSION

Though similar in a general way, the character of the wrongs committed against the Jews and the Japanese Americans are not comparable. In the former case, negotiations for reparation were international
in scope, while they were essentially national in the latter. In Germany, there was a successor government to the original wrongdoer; in
the United States, there is no such difference.
Despite such distinction, there is one overwhelming similarity:
any compensation provided for innocent persons deprived of their liberty, solely on the basis of race, should not have to rely on legal obligations. Such compensation should rest on the moral obligation!to atone
for an injury to human rights, an injury for which there can never be
adequate justification or absolution. There can, however, be a good
faith effort to redress the injury. What distinguishes the policies of the
FRG so particularly is that, even though other gains were at stake, no
real legal obligation to make amends existed. For this reason, the policy sets a strong precedent for all nations.
"Governing through conscience" is not so foreign a concept that
the United States can completely ignore it. As a self-professed leader
in the fight for international human rights, the United States should not
wait for legal precedents, or the potential for international benefits, in
order to act swiftly and uncompromisingly to right a grave injustice in
this country's history. The fact that the commission was established is
an encouraging sign that the government is willing to atone for its
wrong; it should use the opportunity to do so meaningfully, and not as
a method of easy absolution.
Konrad Adenauer, in a speech before the German federal legislature, enunciated the significance of moral considerations. In reference
to laws of the Federal Republic forbidding discrimination based on
sex, race, etc., he said:
These legal principles have the immediate effect of law, requirig every German citizen-and in particular, every official of the

state--to reject any form of racial discrimination.... These principles, however, can take effect only if the convictions out of which
they were born become the common property of the entire people.
Justice is primarily a problem of education. The Federal govern112. Interview with John "Tateishi,Japanese American Citizens' League for Redress and
Reparations, September 1980, San Francisco, California.
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ment considers it urgently necessary. .. that the spirit of human
and religious tolerance in the. .. people... shall not only be formally recognized, but shall become a fact in spiritual attitude and
."1 13
practical action ..
In the case of the Japanese Americans, the United States has an
opportunity, like the FRG, to translate a spirit of democracy and equal
justice into the common property of the entire nation. In this manner,
the United States can reaffirm the principles upon which the nation was
founded; hopefully the nation will respond wth fairness, thoroughness,
and justice.

113. THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 32.

